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PEACE BUILDING AND
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION
Kevin P. Clements
The world clearly needs some new ways of thinking about old problems and new ways of acting if we
are going to survive into the 21st century. It is vital, therefore, that students of peace and conflict work
out ways of harnessing the creative imagination of everyone so that all peoples can envisage a positive
future and ways of realizing that future. This imagining cannot be narrow. It has to be broad, inclusive,
interdisciplinary and systemic but it has to begin if we are to have a viable future.

In relation to this imaging, peace and conflict theorists need to learn from evolutionary theorists
if they are to play a significant part in global survival. In the first place, this means endeavoring
to gather the wisdom of many peoples and traditions since without this our understanding of the
way the world works will always be partial and our normative prescriptions always biased.
What is missing in most of the social sciences and in much of our work in conflict analysis and
resolution are opportunities to hear what the voiceless, the marginalized, the excluded and the
victims have to say. Scholars spend too much time listening to each other, which is not good
from an evolutionary perspective. We need to tap into deeper wells of wisdom since all human
beings have their own survival strategies and everyone has developed some techniques for the
peaceful resolution of conflict.
What is also missing are dialogues across the huge social fissures -- those of class, those that
exist between persons locked into cultures of violence and those working to build cultures of
peace, as well as those that flow from gender and ethnicity. We need some deep dialogues
between the so- called learned and unlearned and between ancient and modern wisdom.
In relation to agricultural development strategies, for example, what sort of dialogue might ensue
from bringing together peasant rice farmers or fishermen from different parts of the world with
Harvard agricultural economists? What problems might surface and what difference might this
make to national and global thinking about rural development in Asia, Africa and Latin
America? Here I am not thinking about experts visiting peasants in order to help them, but I am
talking about inviting these people to our conferences so that we might learn from them and they
from us.
If we are not a lot more creative about ways of stimulating imaginative discourse, there is a high
probability that much of the world's important adaptive wisdom will not be heard and we (from
the industrialized West) will impose our learning in ways that will almost certainly result in
accelerated destruction (Faure, 1995).
While the causes of war and violence and the conditions for peace and justice are at the heart of
peace and conflict studies, they need to be both understood and addressed in innovative ways if
we "conflict resolutionaries" are to make a significant contribution to the survival of the species
and develop a deepened awareness of how we can enhance the quality of life for all peoples.

The cessation of the cold war -- despite our fervent hopes -- did not result in stable peaceful
relationships within and between all countries. Germany was reunited but the former Soviet
Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia (before it split into the Czech and Slovak Republics) Sudan,
Somalia, Nigeria, Liberia, Ghana, Rwanda, Burundi (to name just a few) are afflicted by
powerful ethno- nationalist and secessionist movements. These movements challenge diverse
forms of government and generate particularly virulent and atavistic nationalisms. As Jongman
and Schmid note, during the years 1994-95, for example, there were 1.2 million deaths in high
intensity conflicts and at least 10,000 others were killed in smaller conflicts. Or to put it another
way, there were 22 high intensity conflicts, (wars with more that 1,000 deaths per year) 39 lower
intensity conflicts (101-999 deaths) and 40 serious disputes (<than 100 deaths per year)
occurring across the world up to July last year (Jongman and Schmid, 1995).
The causes of these conflicts are complex and multi-linear and there is a widespread
disillusionment with politics. There are other sorts of conflicts as well, such as those around
scarce natural and other resources (e.g., over water and oil), ideological and belief factors and
deep seated challenges to identity and belonging. Most of these recent conflicts are internal in
nature. All of them result in widespread personal suffering and social and political dislocation.
At an attitudinal level these conflicts are inimical to the broad imagination spelled out above.
They result, on the part of the protagonists, in an inability to think optimistically, distorted tunnel
vision, restricted options, misattribution of motives, stereotyping and polarization. Conflict
analysis, therefore, has a continuing task providing attitudinal and behavioral alternatives to
these negative processes since they tend to be the breeding grounds for more direct violence.
Focussing on some of the old/new problems of direct violence forces us to think afresh about
more fundamental social processes underlying structural violence as well. In particular, we need
to pay more attention to pre- and post-conflict peacebuilding, creative analytical problem solving
processes and conflict transformation. There is some urgency about this because of totalizing and
totalitarian tendencies in different societies and the need to start thinking about new ways of
doing politics. It is especially vital to think of ways in which the quality of relationships within
and between groups, nations and regions may be enhanced, communities made more resilient
and power asymmetries reduced.
The challenge facing peace and conflict studies, therefore, is to think of new ways of doing
politics and of building moral conventions that will generate safe action spaces for all peoples to
begin solving the big problems that afflict the globe. One of the reasons for doing this, which
partly explains the disillusionment with contemporary power and politics is the perception that
adversarial politics (from the microcosm of the family to the community, national and
international levels) are proving more dysfunctional than functional.
Adversarial politics generate more heat than light and stimulate competitive processes that are
inimical to rational problem solving. They also tend to generate violent discourse and, when
taken to extremes (as they are in an increasing number of societies), dispose parties towards
extremely violent behavior. There is a need, therefore, to generate some creative alternatives.
In particular peace and conflict studies needs to articulate some philosophical justification for the
development of "collaborative and analytic problem solving processes" as an alternative to more
coercive and forceful processes.

What are the ethical and empirical justifications, for example, for assuming "common wisdom"
among citizens? What sorts of "moral" and "empirical" justifications are needed to support
inclusive and participatory political processes within which parties to conflict can generate their
own solutions to problems rather than have solutions imposed upon them? Is there an emerging
global bias in favor of civil society and away from the state centric processes of the past? If so,
what shape will this take and what sorts of new institutional forms are needed to give expression
to these new ways of doing business?
One thing is very clear: the alternatives to power politics and the development of more stable
peaceful relationships between peoples lie in a deepening awareness of the key psychological,
social and political processes which generate trusting communities within which individuals can
realize their deepest sense of self. In fact, the renewed emphasis on social and psychological
processes, conversational styles and the identification of different types of epistemic
communities is one of the major hallmarks of modernity/post modernity. While this emphasis on
process can sometimes result in a self indulgent quest for personal happiness and an instrumental
view of relationship it can also be used to begin the more difficult task of critiquing existing
institutions and developing new ones.
Let us identify some general structural trends. The logic of global economic, social and political
development is currently leading in two slightly contradictory directions. The first is towards a
deepened sense of globalization. Economically, for example, multinational companies are now
the norm rather than the exception. Global trade has become more highly integrated than ever
before, and there is now something approximating a single global market in finance,
commodities, manufacturing and services. This is having both positive and negative
consequences. It has severely undermined old concepts of national economic sovereignty and
there are few countries able to withstand external and internal currency flows, most of which
have nothing to do with trade and everything to do with financial speculation. The fact is,
however, that the global economy is now an established reality and this is beginning to pose its
own distinctive sets of national, regional and global problems.
There has been a rapid expansion of the intergovernmental sphere as well. The 187 member
states of the United Nations try and maintain some sense of their own rights as sovereign
political entities, but increasingly the problems that these states confront are regional and global
in scope and cannot be dealt with on national terms alone. This is forcing an unprecedented
amount of intergovernmental collaborative activity. There are 2,000 plus intergovernmental
bodies created to deal with a wide spectrum of interstate problems, such as environmental
degradation, currency and population flows (Boulding, 1995). Similarly, there are now roughly
62,000 international treaties providing contextual frameworks within which international
politics, trade and commerce can take place. While these developments may have had their
origin in the long transition to capitalism, they have really only become significant in the last 20
years. These trends have been accompanied by a strengthening of regional organizations such as
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) the European Community (EC), the
Organization of American States (OAS) and the Organization for African Unity (OAU). Since
1989, the United Nations, itself has begun to occupy a much more central position in world
affairs although it is currently afflicted by a crisis of overexpectations and under-resourcing.

Accompanying the development of intergovernmental organizations, there has been a most
astonishing proliferation of international non-governmental organizations as well. Elise
Boulding, for example, calculates as many as 20,000 such organizations now link different parts
of the world (Boulding, 1988). Despite the criticism of commentators such as John Mearsheimer
(1994-95), who argues that this international institution building offers false promise and we are
far better served by placing faith in the continued power and potency of the nation state, this
unprecedented emergence of cross cutting and overlapping global networks of governmental and
nongovernmental relationships is providing different arenas for the formation of new
transnational identities and placing a major question mark over traditional views of nationalism.
The second major tendency, however, is both a reaction to globalization and a self-propelling
dynamic. This is the process of fragmentation sometimes referred to as "retribalization," when
different religious, ethnic, communal or nationalist groups desire to reassert their distinctive,
separate identities in opposition to the homogenization (Coca-Colonization) of global culture and
the world economy. These fragmentary processes are not in themselves negative, particularly if
they are linked to the development of a pluralistic global community and the concept of a civic
rather than an ethnically based nationalism.1 Ethnically based belonging and ethno-nationalist
processes can be very negative, however, and are the source of some very deep-seated conflicts
when they occur in countries with weak or illegitimate political regimes, where the groups
concerned have adopted armed strategies or terrorism to assert their collective identities, and
where they encounter authoritarian and repressive responses. If these conditions overlay adverse
economic and social conditions, there is a very high probability of coercive politics and violent
conflict.
These two general tendencies produce conditions which, paradoxically, make some violent
conflicts less probable and others more so. International conflicts, for example, the Gulf War
notwithstanding, are less likely to occur in the 1990s than internal conflicts. Thus the external
justifications for militarism are diminishing.
On the other hand, as demonstrated by the experience of the past two years, there is a high
probability of many vulnerable states or societies fracturing and failing, with the prospect of a
sharp increase in violent internal conflict. Thus it is possible to identify new zones of conflict
and new zones of peace in the world. These zones correspond to North-South divisions to a large
extent, but not always so.2 The zone of conflict is one where there are fragile economies, weak
polities subject to vigorous and unrestrained assertion of ethnic rights leading to secessionist
impulses. Over the last three years 92% of the world's most violent conflicts have been internal.3
These two tendencies -- towards globalization and towards fragmentation or retribalization -provide the world community with both crises and opportunities. The crises are appallingly
brutal, whether in Liberia, Rwanda or Bosnia. The opportunities flow from the fact that there is a
growing appreciation of the futility of war (civil or international) in resolving any problem. This
weariness with war is coupled with a better sense of the positive role of international institutions
-- both regional and global -- in peacemaking and conflict transformation. As the External
Affairs Committee of the Canadian House of Commons put it, "The world needs a center, and
some confidence that the center is holding: the United Nations is the only credible candidate"
(cited in Childers and Urqhart, 1994). The problem is that the United Nations itself and many of

the regional organizations are overwhelmed by the new demands that have been placed upon
them.
What is needed, therefore, is a commitment on the part of peacemakers to nudge states and
peoples away from threat based power politics (based on conceptions of hard national
sovereignty) towards a more collaborative nonviolent problem solving orientation. What role can
peace builders and conflict "resolutionaries" play in this process and how might they ensure that
their actions result in changes which remove the sources of violence?
There is a tension within the field captured in Jo Scimecca's (1987) article "Conflict Resolution:
The basis for social control or social change?" In this article Scimecca argues that conflict
resolvers who expound an unexamined neutrality normally end up becoming agents of social
control and supporting the status quo (which may be either just or unjust but in most of the major
conflict zones is normally unjust).
Those who imbed their analysis and practice in conflict and change theory, however, will give
more weight to processes of empowerment and liberation from dependent and unequal processes.
Understanding the deforming effects of political asymmetries (power and powerlessness) on
social relationships will result in different kinds of conflict analyses and prescriptions. Those
who understand both politics and economics will be disposed to ensuring that peacebuilding and
problem solving are as much about unmasking the powerful and equalizing unequal relationships
as they are about solving present problems. This is an important antidote to those who see their
role in establishment terms. This advice provides an interesting challenge to the dominant
definitions of crisis management and conflict resolution as understood by intergovernmental
organizations such as the United Nations.
Construed in a radical way, conflict resolution is aimed at enhancing freedom and justice and
maximizing autonomy. This is very worrying to establishment-oriented resolvers concerned
more about preserving harmony and political order than about achieving justice and fairness.
There is an important new article on the role of justice in negotiation by William Zartmann et al.
(1996) on "Negotiation as a Search for Justice." This argues that genuine conflict
resolution/problem solving always involves some implicit or explicit agreement about the notion
of justice. The writers assert that this agreement will, eventually, govern the disposition of the
items in conflict. While they acknowledge the difficulties of defining exactly what is meant by
justice they argue that ignoring it will not result in positive or durable agreements.
There is considerable emasculation of the radical and transformative promise within the conflict
resolving community in the United States and elsewhere. A rather unseemly commercialization
of the profession has numerous conflict resolution experts competing with each other to provide
quick fixes to a range of tractable and intractable problems. To do this they devise and design
processes ('ten steps to mediation', 'seven steps to happiness') which are then sold to those who
are embroiled in conflict of one sort or another. The promises normally offer more than the
reality in most instances, although some of the processes may provide helpful additions to
negotiators' toolboxes. Very few of these dispute systems are oriented towards non-adversarial
politics and the joint construction of macro futures; even fewer emphasize procedural or
substantive justice and the structural transformation likely to result in stable peaceful

relationships. Also, by a removal of normal stresses and strains (what Talcott Parsons used to
call disequilibria), relatively spontaneous adaptations of individual, social and cultural systems
might not take place either.
So what is the promise and what are the essential ingredients of peacebuilding and conflict
transformation?

(1) It should be aimed at channelling the energy generated by conflict in constructive, nonviolent rather
than destructive and violent directions. Its aim is not to eliminate conflict but to utilize conflictual
processes for generative and positive change (which may be relatively spontaneous or directed).

(2) Conflict transformation occurs when violent conflict ceases and/or is expressed in nonviolent
ways and when the original structural sources (economic, social, political, military, and cultural)
of the conflict have been changed in some way or other.
(3) Conflicts can be transformed, by normal socio-political processes (incremental changes through time)
by the parties acting alone, by expert third party intervenors and parties acting together and/or by
judicious advocacy and political intervention. Conflict transformation should incorporate a wide crosssection of political decision-makers, citizens, aid and development agencies, religious organizations and
social movements. Too often, in the past, conflict transformation has been conceptualized largely as a
political problem. It has to be cast as a social and economic problem as well if sustainable structural
change is to occur.
(4) Such conflict transformation can take place at any stage of the escalatory cycle. If preventive
peacebuilding does not take place at the first sign of trouble and problems remain unaddressed, then
transformational processes, in the early stages of an evolving conflict, may take the form of early
warning and the application of suitable preventive measures. As the conflict escalates (especially if it
turns violent), transformation may depend on some kind of crisis management or intervention and later
it may require conciliation, mediation, negotiation, arbitration and collaborative problem solvingprocesses. Finally, of course conflict transformation involves reconstruction and reconciliation.
Peacebuilding strategies, as I understand them and as they were conceptualized in Gareth Evans' (1993)
book, are all those processes that seek to address the underlying causes of violent conflicts and crises
either to provent them (to use John Burton's rather infelicitous term) or if they have occurred, to ensure
that they will not recur. They have a strong preventive character and are aimed at meeting basic needs
for security and order, shelter, food and clothing, and for recognition of identity and worth.
Peacebuilding is what most civilized societies do spontaneously -- namely develop effective national and
international rule making regimes, dispute resolution mechanisms and cooperative arrangements to
meet basic economic, social, cultural and humanitarian needs and to facilitate effective global
citizenship.

This is the foundational base of conflict transformation. It occurs at all levels in the home, in the
community, nationally and internationally. Putting in place arms control regimes, the
International Court of Justice, and increasing numbers of confidence building mechanisms are all
attempts to ensure that national and international transactions are cooperative and peaceful. So

are in-country initiatives that are aimed at reducing gaps between the rich and the poor,
extending basic human rights between all peoples, and building sustainable development
processes. In these resilient societies, individuals and collectivities acknowledge the
pervasiveness and positive utility of conflict and have developed institutional mechanisms for
channelling them in creative directions. This particular element of conflict transformation is key
to all the rest.
The Social Policy and Resettlement Division of the World Bank has acknowledged this in a
recent report on Post Conflict Reconstruction (Holtzman, 1996). They highlighted the strong
correlation between poverty and conflict and note that fifteen of the twenty least developed
countries in the world have been involved in major violent conflicts, and over half of all low
income countries have been involved in major civil conflicts during the past fifteen years. The
Bank identifies six basic elements in a reconstruction post-conflict peacebuilding strategy
(Holtzman, 1996):







Jump starting the national economy;
Decentralized community based investments;
Repairing key transport and communications networks;
Demining (where relevant and linked to other priority investments);
Demobilization and retraining of ex-combatants;
Reintegration of displaced populations

Even these minimalist goals are unlikely to reach fruition unless accompanied by processes which
restore open and free communications, rebuild trust, help parties understand how to overcome past
enmities, enable an accurate diagnosis of problems and generate new kinds of interactive frameworks.

It is in relation to these sorts of issues that there should be a strategic marriage between
collaborative (interactive to use Herb Kelman's terms) analytical problem-solving workshops
(CAPS) and specific peace building processes -- especially those connected to a wider variety of
economic and social development initiatives. I had hopes, for example, that An Agenda for Peace
and An Agenda for Development might be combined in an "Agenda for Human Security" and
that the Social Summit might be linked to the Security Council Summit preceding An Agenda for
Peace. This was not to be, so it is important that CAPS methods be used to make these linkages
in order to combine the development and conflict resolution discourses, since these are key to
successful peacebuilding and to the transformation of hostile relationships.
The interactive problem-solving approach involves (1) identification and analysis of the problem,
(2) joint shaping of ideas for solution, (3) influencing the other side, and (4) creating a supportive
political environment (Kelman, 1996). Not only does this provide a critical backdrop to deeper
understandings of the dynamics of the conflict itself, or in changing images of one's own party
and of the adversaries, but it is essential to the development of a successful peacebuilding
strategy as well.
Most problem solving workshops have been overwhelmingly preoccupied with resolution of
political conflicts through applying what William Zartmann terms the "formula and details" to

the resolution of protracted conflicts (Zartmann et al., 1996). Although economic, developmental
and infrastructural elements have often figured within the workshops (especially as leverage in
the reaching of a political solution to a military problem) there have been relatively few
workshops that have assigned primacy to development issues as a means whereby the parties
might establish formula and details for the resolution of the political and military issues in
question. Yet the outcome of focusing on the political economy of the conflict must be more
imaginative solutions to the needs and fears of all adversaries. If adversaries can identify a wide
variety of post-conflict economic and social opportunities, this will generate reassurance and
confidence and a willingness to accommodate the interests of the other in relation to the specifics
of terminating the violence and seeking some long-term transformations.
Universities, peace-building intervention centers, regional organizations (such as the OAU, the
OAS , the EC, and the ASEAN) all have a part to play in relation to peacebuilding, preventive
diplomacy, and other early and creative interventions in potentially violent conflicts. The United
Nations clearly can play a critical role as a coordinator of a variety of actors and initiatives in the
prevention and pre-emption of violent conflict. It is global in scope and it has a full range of
conflict- resolution mechanisms available to it, ranging from good offices through military
peacekeeping. As Connie Peck (1996) suggests, the United Nations embodies all approaches to
conflict resolution.
[A]n interest based approach, a rights based approach and a power based approach, with each
corresponding roughly to the organs of the United Nations -- good offices of the Secretary General and
his envoys representing the organization's interest based approach; the judicial functions of the World
Court representing its rights based approach; and the Security Council representing its power based
approach.
The trick is to work out how to transform conflicts before there is any need to invoke the Security
Council and its power based tactics. Most recent conflicts suggest that the United Nations conflict
transformation/resolution capabilities will be enhanced if there is a willingness to incorporate national
and international nongovernmental as well as governmental actors in the process (Track I and Track II
actors). To do this effectively, however, involves organizational changes within the United Nations, the
harnessing of political will to solve problems in a peaceable fashion as well as the generation of
sufficient resources to make peacebuilding, conflict transformation, relationship and community
building the top priority for the United Nations and other international organizations. The key question
here, is how to shift official and unofficial opinion in favor of security-generating preventive measures -a focus on good governance, just social and economic conditions and acting early in the solution of
problems before they go critical. There is an underlying need for mechanisms which enable potential
antagonists to surface problems before they start fighting about them and for institutional mechanisms
to provide a quiet and effective response.

What is likely to shift adversaries, third party intervenors, governments, IGOs, NGOs and the
UN itself to start adopting a more holistic view of these processes, to combine collaborative
problem-solving techniques with the development of just and sustainable social, economic and
political systems?

In the first place, we need to start looking for what Elise Boulding (1995, p. 202) calls "signals of
peace" or what Jim Wallis (1995, p. 175) calls "Signs of Transformation." These are nonviolent
opportunities for creative solutions in moments of tension and in relation to all social and
political problems. We need to look for these at home first and then abroad. In Wallis' view these
signs of transformation include assigning priority to the poor, highlighting compassion and
breaking down divisions between Us and Them, ensuring that Community becomes the moral
foundation for economics and a host of other things as well such as reverence for the whole
creation, joy and hope (Wallis, 1995, pp. 175-177). This means reinforcing cultures of peace
rather than cultures of violence. The creation and enhancement of cultures of peace and
structures to give expression to them requires considerable human ingenuity. We have to be
sensitive to and nurture them when we see them.
Second, and as a part of the first task, we need to become more comfortable with ambiguity,
more accepting of the generative as well as the destructive power of conflict and more aware of
how we can utilize conflicts to transform processes and institutions in a constructive fashion. It is
how conflicts are dealt with which will determine creative or destructive outcomes.
Third, if we are to counter the pessimism of "realpolitik,"4 we need to have a reality based
optimism so that we can operate on best rather than worse case assumptions.
Fourth, all parties to conflicts (no matter how powerful/powerless, official or unofficial they are)
have a right to be involved in the solutions of their own problems. If they are excluded, there is a
strong probability that whatever settlement/solutions might be reached will fail, thereby forcing
the imposition of other partial settlements/solutions which will prove equally fragile.
Fifth, it is important to reiterate the moral dimension of problem solving, including equalization
of power relations between peoples.
Sixth, it is important to practice civility in relationships -- especially if one is offering oneself as
a third party intervenor. There is a long history of such civility by international envoy mediators
(Rosergio, 1995).
Seventh, problems/conflicts must be dealt with as early as possible, when they are relatively
tractable. We need not only to devote more attention to early warning of potential problems, but
to develop the will to start addressing them before they go critical.
Eighth, everyone needs to learn how to resolve conflicts and problems in a nonviolent and
creative fashion. This is a major challenge for education but it lies at the heart of the central
argument in this paper. There is a strong onus of responsibility on peace and conflict theorists to
model a peaceful pedagogy and peaceful research and practice principles so that individuals
everywhere develop a critical orientation to orthodox ideas and relationships and deal with their
conflicts nonviolently and generatively. Peace and security has to become everyone's business.
As Michael Banks (1987) puts it:
People trained in adversarial techniques (lawyers, diplomats, the military) tend to advocate
policies which build walls between parties; people trained in problem solving techniques

(businessmen, psychologists, technical experts) are more likely to advocate policies which build
bridges between parties. Reliance upon a single channel of communication foments
misperception; multiple channels give more opportunity to perceive the opponent realistically.
Isolationism puts an actor at risk; interdependence, if encouraged, generates a network of crisscrossing relationships which can ultimately become impossible to tear apart.
This is the challenge for peace and conflict studies: how can we develop a web of interdependent
relationships which will enable the application of reason to problems and their nonviolent
resolution? The answer to this question lies in the enhancement of relationship, community and
civil society and in the conversations that make this possible between all sorts of identity groups
and epistemic communities.

Endnotes

1. For an excellent analysis of the positive and negative consequences of these two principles see
Ignatieff, 1993.
2. For an interesting discussion on the way in which economic growth challenges environmental
survival and relegates two thirds of the world's population to second class citizenship or worse
see Susan George, 1993. Her central argument is that the reigning "structural adjustment" model
may accumulate hard cash for debt repayment, but such programs "devastate the lives of the
poor, make those of the middle class more precarious and tend to wreak havoc with the
environment."
3. See PIOOM Newsletter, Vol. 6, no. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 20-21, for an excellent map plotting
Wars and Armed Conflicts in 1993.
4. For a particularly gloomy account of the realpolitik position see Gray, 1994. In this article he
asserts that there are four broad assumption to safety in statecraft which are that (1) bad times
return, (2) there are thugs out there, (3) military power is trumps, and (4) new world orders come
and go and come again.
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